Options Against Pakistan...

Is hot pursuit an option? Targeted killings of jihadi terrorist leaders? Air strikes on training camps in Pakistan? US and Israel models? Why does US not act on evidence against Pakistan? And many more questions - is cover action the only practical option left?
B. RAMAN
- Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India

This paper seeks to answer a number of questions which I have received from the readers after the Mumbai blasts of 11/7 .

Is hot pursuit an option against Pakistan for continuing to sponsor jihadi terrorism against India?

No. It is not. The doctrine of hot pursuit acquired some prominence during the Vietnam war against the Americans. Taking advantage of the lack of government control over the border areas of Laos and Cambodia, the Vietcong set up its sanctuaries there. Vietcong groups used to cross into South Vietnam, attack American troops and withdraw into their sanctuaries in Laos or Cambodia. The Americans said they would exercise their right of hot pursuit, chase the Vietcong into Laotian or Cambodian territory and put an end to the sanctuaries and kill those who attacked the Americans.

A similar situation does not prevail with regard to Pakistan-sponsored jihadi terrorism. There is no part of Pakistani territory over which the Pakistani Army does not have effective control. The jihadi terrorists do not have de facto territorial control in the border areas. The Vietcong would start from a point, enter South Vietnam, attack American troops and go back to the point from where they started. Jihadi terrorists do not operate that way. They do not indulge in hit and run raids. They come into India from different points through different routes and disperse in different directions after their terrorist strikes. They rarely escape directly into Pakistan. Moreover, many jihadi terrorist strikes are acts of suicide terrorism.

To talk of hot pursuit of suicide terrorists would be absurd.

How about targeted killings of jihadi terrorist leaders based in Pakistani territory?

A policy of targeted killings of terrorist leaders may work in the case of a terrorist organisation such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and organised crime groups such as that of Dawood Ibrahim, but is unlikely to work in the case of jihadi terrorist organisations. Jihadi terrorists are taught that it is glorious to kill a non-Muslim and it is even more glorious to die while trying to kill a non-Muslim. They are dying to die. They believe in the glories of martyrdom while waging a jihad. Targeted killings would add to their martyrs' gallery. The killed leaders would be easily replaced.

Why don't we make an air strike on their training camps in Pakistani territory since we know where they are located?

These training camps are improvised structures. Mostly tents. The jihadi terrorists are like gypsies. They keep moving their training camps from place to place. Air strikes may temporarily put a training infrastructure out of action, but not permanently. The American Cruise missile attacks of October 1998, and their post 9/11 air strikes have not destroyed the training infrastructure of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The terrorists did suffer some casualties, which they were able to absorb and move to other places.

How do the US and Israel act against state-sponsors of terrorism threatening the lives of their nationals and their national interests?

They follow a mix of the doctrines of passive and active defence. Passive defence is you tighten your physical security and keep your counter-terrorism operations confined to your territory. Active defence is you take your counter-terrorism operations outside your territory, if it becomes necessary. Active defence can be used against the terrorists operating against you from a foreign territory or against the state using terrorism against you or both. Active defence can be open through the conventional armed forces or covert through special forces.

Examples of open active defence: the US bombing of an alleged terrorist base in Libya in 1986, the Cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda camps in Afghan territory in October 1998, the post-9/11 military action in Afghanistan and the current operations of the Israeli army in the Lebanon.

Examples of covert active defence: Israeli attacks on Palestinian leaders when the Palestine Liberation Organisation was based in Tunisian territory in the 1980s, their counter-terrorism operations in other places such as Malta, and France's alleged kidnapping of Carlos in Auguast 1994, from Khartoum.

Have the policies of the US and Israel succeeded?

Not so far.

Why have they not succeeded?

Because they have been targeting their action against the terrorists operating from foreign territory and not against the states sponsoring and using the terrorists. The US-led coalition is unlikely to succeed in Afghanistan so long as they do not end the Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban and its complicity with Al Qaeda. Israel is unlikely to succeed against the Hezbollah and the Hamas so long as it does not end their sponsorship by Iran and Syria. The collapse of the ideological terrorist groups of West Europe after the collapse of the Communist states of East Europe shows how state-sponsored terrorist organisations find it difficult to survive when deprived of support from their state-sponsors. The international community will continue to face difficulty in prevailing over global jihadi terrorism unless and until it acts unitedly against the triumvirate of state-sponsors -- Pakistan, Iran and Syria.

Why are the US and Israel not acting against Pakistan, Iran and Syria?

In its war against terrorism spawned and nurtured in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, the US has four objectives:

to pre-empt the possibility of another 9/11 in US territory;
to prevent the jihadi terrorists from getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear assets;
to prevent a Talibanisation of Pakistan; and
to create normalcy and political stability in Afghanistan.
For achieving the first three objectives, it thinks it needs the support of the Pakistan army. But continued support for the Pakistan Army and the present military-controlled regime headed by Gen.Pervez Musharraf would come in the way of achieving the fourth objective. It has to choose between Musharraf and stability in Afghanistan. It has presently chosen Musharraf, but things could change if Al Qaeda carries out another 9/11 in the US homeland, which is proved to have been planned and executed from Pakistani territory.

Israel does not attack Iran and Syria because of fears that it could lead to a wider war in West Asia. It would need the political, moral, economic, diplomatic and military support of the US if it has to face the risk of such a wider war. Israel is, therefore, unlikely to attack Iran and Syria without a green signal from the US. But Israel may not hesitate to act unilaterally to wipe out Iran's military nuclear capability, even without approval from the US, if and when it decides that the international community is unlikely to act against Iran. Nuclear weapons in the hands of a state-sponsor of terrorism like Iran, which wants to destroy Israel, will not be tolerated by Israel.

What are the chances of the international community acting unitedly against Pakistan, Iran and Syria?

Very remote, at present. Things could change if there is an act of mass casualty terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material and Pakistan is found to have been the source of this material.


Why is the US repeatedly rejecting India's evidence regarding the Pakistani State sponsorship of jihadi terrorism directed against India despite the growing strategic relations between India and the US?
The reasons are partly strategic, partly tactical and partly historic. The strategic reason is that the US looks upon Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia as the moderate core of the Islamic Ummah. It wants to preserve and strengthen this core and expand its influence over the rest of the Ummah. The tactical reason is that, in the US perception, the co-operation of Pakistan is essential for preventing another 9/11 in US territory. Preventing another 9/11 is more important for the US than preventing any number of 11/7s in Indian territory. Pakistani co-operation helps save American lives. Indian co-operation does not. Only if and when it is proved that the Pakistani co-operation no longer helps save American lives, is the US likely to re-consider its policy towards Pakistan. If the US has to make a strategic choice between India and Pakistan, it would choose India. If it has to make a tactical choice between the two, it would choose Pakistan. The historic reason is the help extended by Pakistan to the US during the cold war in its efforts to defeat international communism.
Why then are we repeatedly going to the US with our evidence against Pakistan when we know the US is going to reject it?
Public diplomacy against Pakistan on its sponsorship of terrorism has to be an important component of our counter-terrorism policy. This public diplomacy has three sides:
first, to show to the international community that our repeated efforts to make Pakistan give up its sponsorship of terrorism have failed;
second, to tell the international community, particularly the US, that its repeated refusal to accept and act on our evidence against Pakistan has left us with no other option except to use other ways to deal with Pakistan's state-sponsorship of terrorism against India;
third, to repeatedly remind public opinion in other countries that their governments' short-sighted policy of refusing to act against Pakistan is going to boomerang on them in the form of more 9/11s, originating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region.
The doctrine of the right of active defence against a state-sponsor was first enunciated by Mr George Shultz, who was Secretary of State in the Ronald Reagan administration, in a statement made by him after the death of nearly 200 US Marines in a car bomb attack in Beirut in the 1980s. This was further reinforced by Mr George Bush, the father of the present President, when he was the Vice-President under Reagan and chaired a Special Task Force on Counter-terrorism. Under this doctrine, the US would first try all conventional options against State-sponsors--political, economic, diplomatic etc-- but if these failed to produce results, it would not hesitate to resort to unconventional options to make it clear to the guilty states that their sponsorship of terrorism would not pay. This counter-terrorism road map is now generally accepted all over the world. Public diplomacy is an important stage in this road map.
We have to make it clear to Pakistan and the international community--particularly the US, which is the most important sponsor of this state-sponsor of terrorism--that we tried all reasonable and conventional means of putting an end to Pakistan's state-sponsorship. Since these have not produced results and the international community has failed to stand by India, we have no other option but to take to unconventional means.

What has been the state of our public diplomacy against Pakistan on the question of its sponsorship of terrorism against India?

It started under Rajiv Gandhi and continued under Shri V.P.Singh, Shri Chandrasekhar and P.V.Narasimha Rao. It was neglected under Shri Dev Gowda and Shri Inder Gujral. It was kept up in fits and starts under Shri A.B.Vajpayee and totally neglected since Dr.Manmohan Singh took over as the Prime Minister. Since September 2004, there has not been a categorical and direct criticism by him of Pakistan's continued state sponsorship. Even in his remarks after his visit to the scene of the Mumbai blasts of 11/7, he made only a soft, indirect allusion to Pakistan without clearly naming it. They appeared to be meant more to respond to domestic public opinion in India than to convey an unambiguous message to Pakistan.
If our own Prime Minister fights shy of calling a spade a spade, how can we expect the international community to do so? At some international seminars attended by me since September 2004, when I raised the issue of continued Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism, many in the audience remarked: "Your own Prime Minister is no longer talking of it. Why do you keep harping on it?" The policy of "See No Evil, Hear No Evil and Speak No Evil", which the Prime Minister seems to be following in respect of Pakistan and the US could prove counter-productive.

Why do we keep asking the US to declare Pakistan a state-sponsor of terrorism? Why can't we do it ourselves?

To my knowledge, the US is the only country in the world in which the concept of state-sponsorship of terrorism figures in the statute book. When the US declares a state as a state-sponsor of Terrorism, certain punitive consequences follow such as stoppage of military supplies, economic sanctions etc. Pakistan could be hurt by a US declaration. We had seen how the invoking of the Pressler Amendment on the nuclear issue against Pakistan in 1990 by the US halted the progress of the Pakistani economy, created difficulties for its Air Force and almost brought its economy to the verge of collapse in the 1990s when Mr Nawaz Sharif and Mrs Benazir Bhutto were Prime Ministers. An Indian declaration of Pakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism will not have any impact on Pakistan.

Is military action against Pakistan an option?

It is no longer an option after 9/11. Pakistan is now declared as a major non-NATO ally of the US. There is a growing American presence in Pakistan. US intelligence agencies, particularly the National Security Agency (NSA) which is responsible for the collection of technical intelligence, have a strong presence in Pakistan to collect intelligence about Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The USA's and the NATO's top priority is their operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Pakistan Army has deployed a large number of its troops in the Waziristan area to help the Americans operating in Afghanistan. As a quid pro quo, it would expect the US to ensure that India does not take advantage of this for counter-terrorism related military strikes in Pakistan. The US would try to prevent any military strikes by us . Even if we take the US by surprise and launch a military strike, the US and the other NATO countries would try to bring the strike to a premature conclusion before we had achieved our counter-terrorism objectives. In our planning, we have to take into consideration Pakistan's nuclear capability too.

Then how to make Pakistan pay a price for its state-sponsorship of terrorism against India?

Through covert action, which is deniable para-political and para-military action meant to make Pakistan's sponsorship prohibitively costly to it.

Such a covert action would be directed against the Pakistan state and society and not against the terrorists. Covert actions do not produce quick results. They are gradual in their impact. They have to be well-prepared, well-executed and kept sustained. The liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 was preceded by nearly a decade of covert action in the then East Pakistan at the political, para-political, cultural and other levels in order to create large pockets of alienation against the central government and generate feelings of separateness between the people of West and East Pakistan. If we had not prepared the ground carefully for 10 years, the success would not have come so decisively in 1971.

Why are we not doing it now?

Before 1971, our political leadership was determined that it was not in the national interests of India to let the two wings of Pakistan remain united. Once a political direction came that we should not allow the two wings to remain united, the intelligence agencies and the security forces took the follow-up action and facilitated the achievement of this objective by our armed forces in 1971. In 1981, Pakistan started its sponsorship of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab. Between 1981 and 1987, our political leadership tried to deal with it conventionally. When the conventional options had no impact on Pakistan, a decision was taken by the political leadership that Pakistan must be covertly made to pay a price for its meddling in Punjab.

The intelligence agencies implemented this directive effectively and the message went home to Pakistan. It started cutting down its support to the Khalistani terrorists, which tapered off by 1995. But, in 1997, the political leadership decided, despite the increase in the involvement of Pakistan in the sponsorship of jihadi terrorism, to stop the use of the covert action option. We are paying a heavy price for it since then.

The subsequent governments have been thoroughly confused in their mind about the advisability of resuming covert action. Moreover, before 1997, the American influence on our political leadership and policy-makers was very small. Our leaders and policy-makers rarely bothered about what the Americans would think of our actions. Since 2003 the American influence on us has increased so much that it has come in the way of an aggressive policy approach towards Pakistan.

One has the impression that so far as our policy towards Pakistan is concerned, the US is doing the back-seat driving. We have to rid ourselves of our inhibitions generated by our over-anxiety to keep on the right side of the US, decide what needs to be done to Pakistan and do it. We should decide now lucidly what kind of Pakistan will be in our national interest in the next 10 or 15 years and resolutely work towards it. Our intelligence agencies are capable of doing it provided they have behind them a resolute political leadership which would guide and back them without wavering all the time depending on the signals from Washington.